Two Models of Equality and Responsibility by Risse, Mathias & Blake, Michael
 
Two Models of Equality and Responsibility
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Blake, Michael, and Mathias Risse. 2008. Two models of equality
and responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38(2): 165-
199.
Published Version doi:10.1353/cjp.0.0018
Accessed February 18, 2015 1:51:13 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3710803
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP1
Two Models of Equality and Responsibility
Abstract:  Much  recent  political  philosophy  has  focused  on  the  role  of  responsibility 
within liberal-egalitarian theories of justice, and much of that has been very critical of 
Rawls’s  Theory  of  Justice.    This  debate  overlooks  a  central  distinction  within  the 
taxonomy  of  theories  of  justice.    There  exist  at  least  two visions  of  how  a  liberal-
egalitarian  theory  of  justice  can  integrate  considerations  of  distributive  equality  and, 
derivatively, responsibility. What differentiates these two versions is whether distributive 
equality is taken as immediately plausible or a direct expression of respect for persons (or 
a  related  notion),  or  whether  distributive  equality  is  derived  only in  the  presence  of 
additional claims about normatively relevant relationships among persons. These models 
imply distinct accounts of how responsibility may be integrated into accounts of liberal-
egalitarian justice. This fact allows us to show that, contrary to what has motivated much 
of recent political philosophy, as far as responsibility is concerned, Rawls’s approach is 
not already problematic on its own terms. 
1. Introduction
1.1 Much recent political philosophy has focused on the role of responsibility within 
liberal-egalitarian theories of justice.
1  John Rawls’s theory, in particular, has come in for 
criticism in virtue of its account of responsibility, which Rawls takes to be tied to his 
account  of  primary  goods.    Primary  goods  themselves  have  been  rejected  as  the 
appropriate  “currency”  (or  metric)  of  distributive  justice,  while  Rawls’s  treatment  of 
responsibility has been criticized as implausible or even inconsistent. These criticisms 
have given rise to much of the constructive work political philosophy has done after 
Rawls’s Theory -- one may think of the work of Richard Arneson, G. A. Cohen, Ronald 
                                                
1 Many thanks to Arthur Applbaum, Robert Hockett, Waheed Hussain, Martin O’Neill, 
Tim Scanlon, the participants of the conference on the “Theory and Practice of Equality,” 
held at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard in April 2004, and the 
participants of the Graduate Fellows Seminar at the Center for Ethics and the Professions 
at Harvard for discussion of and comments on earlier versions of this paper. Many thanks 
also to two referees and the editors of this journal. 2
Dworkin, and John Roemer, for whom a major concern is to make more room for a 
suitable  notion  of  responsibility.
2    Their  efforts  are  shaped  by  a  distinction  between 
“choice”  and  “circumstance:”  individuals  should  possess  distributive  shares  in 
accordance with their choices (for which they are responsible) and be compensated for 
disadvantages they have because of their circumstances (for which they are not.)  These 
writers  are  sometimes  called  luck-egalitarians (cf.  Anderson  (1999)  and  Scheffler 
(2003)),  but  their  concerns  are  more  aptly  emphasized  by  calling  them,  following 
Arneson, responsibility-catering egalitarians. 
There are two accounts of how responsibility-catering egalitarianism relates to 
Rawls’s Theory. The first emphasizes continuity: Rawls offers insights about the role of 
responsibility in social justice but leaves them underdeveloped, and it is up to others to 
fill the gap. The second account emphasizes discontinuity: to the detriment of his theory, 
Rawls  fails  to  discuss  responsibility  adequately,  and  thus  social  justice  must  be 
reconceived  to  accommodate  an  appropriate  notion  of  responsibility.  The  continuity 
reading appears in Kymlicka (2002), and a recent interview suggests that Dworkin also 
endorses  it  (cf.  Pauer-Studer  (2002)).
3 The  discontinuity  reading  appears  in  Roemer 
(1996). We believe there are strands in Rawls (1999a) to support both readings, but on 
balance, as Scheffler (2003) also argues, the discontinuity approach is the better reading: 
the differences between a Rawlsian account of social justice and responsibility-catering 
                                                
2 Cf. Cohen (1989), Dworkin (1981), Dworkin (2000), Arneson  (1989), (1990) and 
(1997), and Roemer (1996). 
3 This is a bit surprising, since Dworkin (1981) introduces the criticism of Rawls that his 
difference principle is insensitive to questions of responsibility in terms that fit the 
discontinuity reading. Brian Barry seems to be at least sympathetic to the continuity view 
as well: cf. chapter 9 of Barry (1995), especially pp 54-55. 3
egalitarianism are too big to support an account highlighting continuity. In this spirit, we 
must  proceed  to  offering  actual  responses  to the  objections  to  Rawls’s  treatment  of 
responsibility that motivate responsibility-catering egalitarianism.
4
1.2 Much of this debate overlooks a central distinction within the taxonomy of theories of 
justice.  There exist two different visions of how a liberal-egalitarian theory of justice can 
integrate considerations of distributive equality. On the first account, distributive equality 
- of whatever it is that is distributed – is a necessary implication of the foundational moral 
commitments of a theory of justice.  We will refer to this type of theory as a direct theory 
of distributive justice.  There are at least two possible ways in which such a theory might 
be constructed.  The moral  relevance of distributive  equality might be  understood in 
axiomatic  terms:  for  such  a  theory,  the  distributive  equality  is  the  foundational 
commitment of the theory, and there are no more basic claims from which distributive 
equality is actually derived. Such accounts are committed to distributive equality at the 
                                                
4  There are related contributions in the literature. Lippert-Rasmussen (2001) and 
Scheffler (2003) discuss similar themes but their discussions of criticisms of Rawls focus 
on Dworkin. Scheffler (2005) argues that luck-egalitarianism is misguided because their 
reasons for wanting to integrate responsibility into egalitarian theory conflict with the 
concerns that motivate egalitarianism to begin with. In our terminology, Scheffler could 
be straightforwardly classified as an indirect theorist who argues against direct theorists 
that they have lost sight of the importance of morally important relationships before the 
background of which concerns of distributive equality become relevant. (A similar point 
holds for Anderson (1999).) Schaller (1997) discusses Arneson, but his concerns are 
somewhat different.  Ripstein (1999) can be understood as systematically developing the 
implications of the Rawlsian “division of responsibility” within legal contexts (while his 
chapter 9 and Ripstein (1994) also look at the wider distributive context).  Our 
contribution is twofold: first, we develop a distinction between different ways in which 
the notion of responsibility can be integrated into a theory of distributive equality. And 
second, we apply this distinction to objections against theories such as Rawls’s based 
upon a supposedly inadequate notion of responsibility. We focus on Arneson and Roemer 
because their arguments have not yet received adequate commentary.  4
axiomatic level. The currency, or metric, of distributive justice is such that distributive 
equality is by itself a demand of liberal egalitarianism.  More often, however, the moral 
relevance of distributive  equality is  understood  as an immediate implication  of some 
more foundational notion of equal respect for persons, or some similar notion of moral 
equality. Such accounts are committed to distributive equality as a direct derivation of 
their moral axioms.  While equal distribution of the currency of distributive justice is not 
here an axiomatic demand of liberal egalitarianism, equal distribution follows, without 
additional assumptions, from the conception of equality developed.  Treating people as 
moral equals, for such theories, implies the provision of equal distributive shares.  For 
our purposes, what links such theories and axiomatic theories is the fact that in both cases 
distributive conclusions may be derived from abstract moral egalitarianism.  We will 
refer to all such theories as direct theories of distributive justice.
5
The alternative account might be referred to as an indirect theory of distributive 
justice.  Here, distributive equality may be derived from an account of equal respect of 
persons or some other account of equal personhood, but only in the presence of (and 
essentially  through,  in  a  sense  explained  later)  additional  claims  about  normatively 
                                                
5 Our use of “direct” and “indirect” should not be confused with the use of these terms in 
the analysis of consequentialism.  In that context, this terminology is used to distinguish 
conceptions of consequentialism that assess the objects of evaluation (normally actions) 
in terms of their consequences from conceptions that assess them in terms of rules or 
motives that in turn have good consequences. The former set of conceptions of 
consequentialism is sometimes called “direct” (and act utilitarianism is a common 
example), whereas the latter set is sometimes called “indirect” (rule utilitarianism being a 
common example).  (Cf. article on “Consequentialism” by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong in 
the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/). We do not claim any link between 
the notion of directness in the two contexts; rather, the notion of a “direct” theory of 
justice refers only to the process of logical deduction, not – as in the case of 
consequentialism – the level of specificity at which moral conclusions are derived.5
relevant relationships among persons. The particular case we will be interested in is one 
in which the additional relationships are ones of shared citizenship.
6 Such accounts of 
liberal egalitarianism are committed to indirectly derived distributive equality. On this 
third  model  we  cannot  automatically  infer  any  (even  prima  facie)  injustice  from 
distributive inequality, as we can on the other two. Distributive inequality may merely 
reveal that the relevant relationships do not hold. What concerns us in this study is the 
difference between direct and indirect models of distributive justice.  The former defend 
distributive  equality  without  making  this  demand  dependent  on  the  presence  of 
normatively relevant relationships  that  not  all persons may (and in  practice  will  not) 
share, whereas the latter do appeal to the presence of such relationship. We will refer to 
both models characterized by axiomatic distributive equality and accounts characterized 
by  directly  derived  distributive  equality  as  direct  accounts  of  equality,  and  refer  to 
accounts of the remaining type as indirect accounts.
Which  model  we  adopt  matters  for  assessments  of  distributive  inequality.  In 
particular, these models imply distinct accounts of how responsibility may be integrated 
into accounts of liberal-egalitarian justice. This fact allows us to defend Rawls against his 
critics, by demonstrating that the criticisms described above use a theory of responsibility 
appropriate only to an account of distributive equality alien to Rawls’s theory. To wit: 
Rawls’s, we will suggest, is a theory that endorses indirectly derived distributive equality, 
                                                
6 We do not deny, however, that other such relationships might exist; a fully specified 
comprehensive liberalism might, for instance, specify certain sorts of distributive 
consequences applicable only within the family.  Our present focus, however, is on the 
particular case of political societies, and we will therefore restrict our attention to those 
theories such as Rawls’s political liberalism, which focus on distinctively political 
relationships such as shared citizenship.6
whereas the critics to be discussed hold a theory in which distributive equality is derived 
directly. We confine ourselves to liberal-egalitarian theories of justice because the debate 
we  discuss  is  internal  to  that  family  of  theories.    We  confine  ourselves,  further,  to 
explicitly egalitarian theories of distributive justice, although what we say applies also to 
variants  such  as  prioritarianism.  The  distinction  between  those  three  approaches  to 
equality carries over to such theories. One cannot avoid the conclusions we draw from 
this distinction simply by claiming to be a prioritarian rather than an egalitarian. 
We  do not  here defend an approach to  distributive  equality. We  do think the 
approach that derives equality indirectly should be chosen, but our concern is to develop 
the distinction and to show that it allows us to rebut certain criticisms to Rawls’s account. 
This  moves  the  dispute  to  an  assessment  of  which  approach  to  distributive  equality 
should be preferred, which is where the debate should be. But as far as responsibility is 
concerned, Rawls’s approach is not already problematic on its own terms. 
1.3 Section 2 describes the models of equality we seek to articulate.  We show how the 
differences between these models determine the role of responsibility within the chosen 
theory  of  justice.    Section  3  discusses  the  Rawlsian  notion  of  a  “social  division  of 
responsibility,” a conception in virtue of which Rawls’s is a model in which distributive 
equality is  derived  indirectly.  Sections  4  and  5  apply this  distinction  to  some of  the 
disputes described above.  We seek to show that some of Rawls’s critics employ a view 
of responsibility that is untenable in light of Rawls’s commitments and cannot serve as a 
basis  for  objections.  The  critics,  that  is,  are  committed  to  a  notion  of  responsibility 
available  only  in  direct  models  of  distributive  equality.  Section  4  establishes  these 7
conclusions  with  regard  to  Arneson’s  criticisms.  Section  5  does  so  with  regard  to 
Roemer’s. Roemer is not only concerned to show that Rawls’s view of responsibility is 
inconsistent, but also that egalitarians should drop the veil-of-ignorance device. We hope 
to show that Roemer is wrong.
7 Section 6 concludes. 
2. Direct and Indirect Models of Distributive Equality
2.1 Logically speaking, there are three models of the place of distributive equality within 
a liberal-egalitarian theory of justice. While we discuss them, keep two points in mind. 
To begin with, in each of these models the goods at issue are whichever goods a theory of 
justice distributes. For none of these models does this mean necessarily that those goods 
offer a theory of the “the good” per se – though it might, depending on the account. 
Moreover,  we  do  not  intend  for  some  of  these  models  to  capture  a  moral  notion  of 
equality whereas others capture a political notion. The concern is with a classification of 
theories of justice; how the words “moral” and “political” are to be used depends on the 
details of these theories.
8
It is possible, first, simply to stipulate the relevance from the standpoint of justice 
of an equal distribution of some good – be it welfare, opportunity for welfare, capability, 
or some alternative conception.  If our conception of equality within a theory of justice is 
spelled out in terms of the equality of some good, the distribution of that good becomes
                                                
7 Roemer (1996) contains the most extensive critical discussion of Rawls, whereas 
Roemer (2002) (drawing in Roemer (1996) and Roemer (2001)) argues that egalitarians 
should not use the veil-of-ignorance device. 
8 That said, we will talk about moral and political notions of responsibility within the 
context of the Rawlsian theory and its critics, but by that time we will have introduced 
enough material about the Rawlsian theory for this to be appropriate and clear. 8
relevant for an assessment in terms of justice without further argument.  On this account, 
the fact that two individuals differ in their holdings of this good bears immediately on our 
evaluation  of  their  situations.    Unless  defeated  by  opposing  considerations  that  the 
respective theory of justice may also acknowledge, the conclusion that an injustice exists 
is immediately derivable from this situation. An unequal distribution of the relevant good 
is  prima  facie an  injustice.  We  say  that  such  accounts  are  committed  to  axiomatic 
distributive equality. 
In the second model, it is an ideal of equality of persons, most plausibly equal 
respect and concern for persons, that calls for the equalization of the distributive goods 
identified by the theory as relevant for the purposes of justice. Distributive equality is not 
stipulated, but derived from a normative account of personhood. This model is committed 
to directly derived distributive equality. While the first and second accounts are logically 
distinct, we do not further distinguish between them. An account of distributive equality 
committed to axiomatic distributive equality without endorsing any notion of equality of 
persons from which the distributive equality can be taken to be derived, though logically 
possible, would be rather peculiar. We discuss both types of accounts together under the 
heading of direct models.
The third model sees distributive equality as relevant only in a mediated way. The 
link between equal concern and respect, or any other notion of equality of persons used in 
the respective account, and the distributive goods identified is not through an inference 
that requires no additional assumptions; rather, equalization of these goods is demanded 
only  in  the  presence  of  and  essentially  through  additional  normatively  relevant 
relationships among the respective individuals. While distributions of the chosen metric 9
of  goods  are  not  irrelevant  from  the  standpoint  of  justice,  their  importance  must  be 
established through additional arguments showing that the relevant relationships hold.  
We cannot, from the sheer fact of an inequality in holdings of the good at stake, infer 
even a prima facie injustice. This model is committed to indirectly derived distributive 
equality. For brevity’s sake we talk about the indirect model of distributive equality.
9
The  qualification  “only  in  the  presence  of  and  essentially  through  additional 
normatively  relevant  relationships  among  the  respective  individuals”  requires 
elaboration. What this formulation is intended to make sure is that direct theorists could 
not simply become indirect theorists by adopting the condition that either the axiomatic 
postulation or direct derivation of distributive equality only applies to a certain range of 
people (say, those living within a certain jurisdiction). If this were possibly, there would 
not be much depth to our distinction. That qualification makes sure that the presence of 
those  normatively  important  relationships  is  actually  needed for  the  derivation  of 
distributive equality. The next subsection discusses some theorists and thereby should 
illuminate the distinction between direct and indirect models, and especially make clear 
the relevance of this qualification.  
2.2 To illustrate, consider first Rawls’s theory of justice. According to Rawls, primary 
goods are not always the proper metric for the evaluation of equal concern and respect.  
They become  the appropriate  metric only through  arguments demonstrating that they 
properly express egalitarian concerns within a particular context – the basic structure of a 
                                                
9 When we talk about “holdings of the good at stake,” the good might, of course, be 
welfare. So our talk about “holdings” is by no means confined to material objects. 10
constitutional democracy.
10  The underlying notion of equality of persons by itself is not 
taken to have distributive implications. Rawls’s arguments are designed to show that the 
application  of  such  a  general  framework  to  a  specific  social  context  motivates  the 
relevance  of  a  specific  metric  of  egalitarian  concern  – a  metric  which  is  given  its 
relevance by that  context  and is  applicable only within that context.   This  additional 
argumentative step marks Rawls’s theory as an indirect model of distributive equality.  
Direct  theories  have  no  space  for  this  argumentative  step.  An  example  is  a 
welfare-egalitarian variation of Peter Singer’s brand of utilitarianism. Singer (1993) starts 
with a principle of equal consideration of interests, which he takes to capture the form of 
moral  judgments.
11 Equal  consideration  of  interests  is  taken  to  have  immediate 
distributive  implications,  captured  in  terms  of  well-being,  but  for  Singer  these 
implications are utilitarian (maximizing well-being, rather than equalizing it). Neither the 
significance of well-being per se nor that of its distribution depends on specific social or 
                                                
10 The basic structure of society is the way in which the main political and social 
institutions of society fit together into one system of social cooperation. The two 
principles Rawls argues will be chosen in the original position (behind the “veil of 
ignorance”) to regulate the basic structure are the following (in lexicographic order; cf. 
e.g., Rawls (2001), p 42):  (a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme of liberties for all. (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the “difference principle”). 
11 We use Singer as an example because his moral theory is a particularly clear and 
simple vision of direct theorizing; we read him as a maximizing utilitarian in the tradition 
of Jeremy Bentham.  As such, he represents a thinker for whom distributive 
consequences are directly the result of his axiomatic structure – namely, the welfare of all 
sentient creatures.  Indeed, he has been particularly forthright in refusing to allow 
contextual relationships to enter into his calculations of justice; see Singer (2005).11
political contexts, and much of Singer’s work as a whole argues against assigning much 
relevance to such contexts. Were Singer a welfare-egalitarian rather than a utilitarian, his 
would be a paradigmatic direct account of equality within a theory of distributive justice. 
G.A. Cohen, Richard Arneson, John Roemer, and Ronald Dworkin are, on this analysis, 
direct theorists as well.
While we will not be concerned with Cohen and discuss Arneson and Roemer in 
sections 4 and 5, we should explain why we claim Dworkin as a direct theorist. Dworkin 
(2000) explains that his book “argues that equal concern requires that government aim at 
a form of material equality that I have called equality of resources” (p 3). Dworkin’s 
theory of equality of resources attempts to explain how that sort of distributional equality 
is  derived  from  equal  concern  and  respect  for  people.  This  much  seems  to  qualify 
Dworkin as a direct theorist par excellence, but he explains as well that “the principle of 
equal importance does require people to act with equal concern toward some groups of 
people in certain circumstances,” and what characterizes these groups is that they are a 
“political community that exercises dominion over its own citizens, and demands from 
them  allegiance  and  obedience  to  its  laws…  Equal  concern  (…)  is  the  special  and 
indispensable virtue of sovereigns” (p 6). In light of this comment he may seem to qualify 
as an indirect theorist instead, since his derivation of distributive equality applies only to 
people subject to the same sovereign jurisdiction.
12
Yet now it becomes important  that we define an indirect theorist as one how 
derives distributional equality not only in the presence of, but also essentially through
                                                
12 This interpretation of Dworkin seems to inform Thomas Nagel’s interpretation of his 
work.  See Thomas Nagel (2005).12
additional  normatively  relevant  relationships  among  the  respective  individuals. 
Dworkin’s  derivation  of  distributive  equality  proceeds  independently  of  these 
sovereignty-considerations: restricting the scope of people affected by this derivation in 
this manner requires an additional and independent argument, which Dworkin offers. The 
fact  that  the  relevant  individuals  are  tied  by  being  subject  to  the  same  sovereign 
jurisdiction (a constraint explicitly or implicitly built into many theories of justice that do 
not take themselves to have international implications) does no work in the derivation of 
distributive equality. This sets Dworkin apart from Rawls, in whose account it is crucial 
for the derivation of distributive equality that the affected individuals are free and equal 
citizens  in  a  system  of  fair  cooperation.  For  Rawls,  it  is  indeed  essentially  through 
normatively relevant relationships that distributive equality is derived; for Dworkin it is 
not.  Therefore,  as  far  as  the  derivation  of  equality  is  concerned,  Rawls  is  indeed  an 
indirect theorist while Dworkin is a direct theorist.  
The  adoption  of  such  a  model  has  significant  implications  for  the  sort  of 
reasoning that is appropriate for a range of questions, and hence also as to the substantive 
conclusions  the  theorist  will  reach.  It  is  because  of  these  implications  that  our 
classification is relevant.  We will here consider three topics: reasoning about the scope 
of such theories will be distinct; about the range of goods over which it has evaluative 
jurisdiction;  and  about the notion  of  responsibility it  takes  as  salient.  The subject  of 
responsibility will then occupy us for the remainder of this study.
2.3 To begin with, within an indirect account, it is straightforwardly plausible to restrict 
the scope of distributive justice to some set of individuals selected by the theory.  The 13
contours of this set are determined by the normatively relevant relationships endorsed by 
the theory. Within the Rawlsian project, the relevant relationship is that of being jointly 
engaged in social cooperation.  If the original position is, as Rawls insists, not a device to 
be employed every time there is the division of a good, but a heuristic device designed to 
show  how  the  principles  of  justice  animating  a  constitutional  democracy  might  be 
derived, the parties to the original position will be limited to those subject to the coercive 
control of the political power of the state.
13 Generally, what is required of respectful 
treatment depends on what structures (cooperative or coercive) the individuals share. 
This approach has implications in a variety of areas; perhaps the most important is 
that of international justice.  For the kind of welfare-egalitarians for whom the fact of an 
inequality in welfare is directly relevant, the different levels of well-being in Western and 
developing economies are a prima facie injustice.
14  Unless some further factor can be 
introduced to defeat the conclusion that differing levels of welfare are illegitimate, such 
inequality gives us reason to condemn the world’s current economic and social situation.  
Yet for Rawls the fact of an inequality in social primary goods becomes problematic as a 
matter of justice only within the context of a domestic political society, and only because 
equality  of  persons  demands  this  equalization  within  this  specific  context.
15    Some 
Rawlsians have chosen  to  extend  the scope of the original position  past  what Rawls 
                                                
13 Cf. Rawls (1993), pp 136-137. 
14  For a well-known example of such reasoning, cf. Singer (1972).  
15  For a justification of this reading of Rawls, see Blake (2001). Cf. Risse (2005) for an 
account of duties in the international arena that is Rawlsian in outlook. 14
himself  regards  as  its  appropriate  space.
16    Others  – notably  Rawls  himself  – have 
rejected this argument; whatever duties of justice exist in the international community, 
they will be distinct in form and content from the duties of domestic justice.
17  
2.4 Reasoning about the range of goods over which distributive justice extends, secondly, 
will be distinct in the two models.  For the direct model, all aspects of life that influence 
the distribution of the good in question are within the purview of justice: since equality of 
a certain good is immediately relevant from the standpoint of justice, or is taken as an 
immediate  expression  of  equality  of  persons,  whatever  affects  its  distribution  might 
similarly be regarded as at least prima facie relevant from the standpoint of justice. It will 
take  independently  plausible  considerations  to  exclude  some  factors  that  affect  that 
distribution, considerations that would have to be consistent with whatever reasons the 
direct theorist has for choosing the good whose distribution matters immediately and for 
insisting on the equality of its distribution. 
We  may  take  Anderson’s  (1999)  hypothetical  idea  of  compensation  for  the 
sexually unattractive as instructive (cf. p 305). While some theories of justice reject such 
an idea, direct accounts can only reject it for second-order reasons; they will invoke 
considerations  of  stability,  argue  that  such  compensation  risks  endangering  the  just 
distribution  of  goods  in  other  spheres  of  human  experience  (perhaps  by  producing 
                                                
16 Cf. Beitz (1979) and Pogge (1989). We do not mean to suggest that the adoption of an 
indirect model by itself commits one to a view of international justice of the sort captured 
by Rawls (1999c). Our point is only that different reasoning will occur in direct and 
indirect models when it comes to international justice. 
17 Cf. Rawls (1999c). 15
additional evils such as resentment and shame among those so compensated), or that 
equality is a political virtue of sorts, one which is only saliently held over a specific range 
of  goods  (excluding  sexual  attractiveness).
18 Yet  indirect  theorists  are  able,  without 
further  ado,  to  restrict  the  scope  of  their  theories.  Indirect  theories  acknowledge  the 
existence  of  normatively  important  relationships  vis-à-vis  which  the  goods  whose 
distribution is to be regulated derive their importance, and it is in light of the nature of 
that relationship that the range of these goods is restricted. Within the Rawlsian project it 
is  natural  to  restrict  the  range  to  goods  created  and  distributed  through  cooperative 
activity.  Since it is the creation of principles of justice to adjudicate this realm that is
sought, goods outside this realm are not implicated within a direct account of distributive 
justice.
19
                                                
18 It is worth emphasizing that these are two different strategies.  The first offers second-
order reasons to defeat what is a prima facie valid implication of a direct egalitarianism; 
the second argues that the direct egalitarianism has a space of goods that does not extend 
to this particular form of value.  The second strategy is one which is available to both 
indirect and direct theories; any particular putative good – such as sexual attractiveness –
might fall outside the range of goods recognized in a given theory, whether indirect or 
direct.  Our claim at present is that a direct theory can exclude such goods even when 
they are indeed potentially relevant from the standpoint of justice, by demonstrating that 
the individuals in question do not stand in the correct form of relationship to one another 
to make their claims valid.  We are grateful to an anonymous editor for this Journal, for 
pressing us to be more clear on this point. 
19 It is possible, of course, that considerations of sexual attractiveness might fall within 
the purview of justice – if such “goods” can be represented as linked importantly to those 
goods relevant to political justice.  We might imagine, for example, that the attractive 
have greater access to political power; in this case, even an indirect theorist would have 
to conclude that a maldistribution has occurred.  Here, however, the maldistribution 
comes in the linkage between the good of political power and sexual attractiveness, rather 
than in the distribution of sexual attractiveness itself.  The latter, for an indirect theory 
such as Rawls’s, does not fall within the purview of distributive justice, and so the 
distribution of this “good” may be allowed to retain whatever shape it happens to take.  
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing us to be more explicit on this 
point.16
While the example of the sexually unattractive is fanciful, the difference in range 
extends to more serious cases.  Kymlicka (2002) charges that Rawls is unable to justify 
his refusal to consider compensation for inequalities in natural primary goods (pp 70-72).  
He argues that Rawls’s reasons for demanding the equalization (subject to the difference 
principle) of social primary goods translate to the sphere of natural primary goods; if we 
care  about  human  well-being,  surely  we  would  care  as  much  about  the  latter  as  the 
former.  Yet the distinction between direct and indirect models demonstrates how this 
charge might be avoided.  For theorists like Rawls, it is not well-being or life-chances 
that are directly relevant for justice.  What is relevant is the project of justifying coercive 
authority to those subject to a state’s jurisdiction. In this project, distributive shares may 
become relevant, inasmuch as the economy is part of the basic structure.  In order to 
justify what we do to one another through the basic structure, we have reason to ensure 
equalization of the benefits and burdens the basic structure creates.  We have reason to 
care about distributive shares of social primary goods, because such goods are ultimately 
the product of a political community in need of justification.  
Natural primary goods, in contrast, exist prior to and (largely) independently of 
the basic structure.
20  They become relevant only when (and to the extent that) they are 
significant for the positions and offices the basic structure creates.  On this analysis, there 
is  nothing  inconsistent  in  insisting  that  natural  primary  goods  such  as  talents  and 
                                                                                                                                                
20 We say “largely” because the influence that natural primary goods will have on 
individual life-chances will depend to a great extent on the arrangements of the basic 
structure. Moreover, the basic structure can be organized in such a way that it allows 
compensation for shortfalls in natural primary goods (e.g. through transfer payments to 
the disabled, or, alternatively, through the legal provision of mandatory access for the 
disabled to public buildings, etc.). On this, see, for example, Wolff (2002).  17
intelligence must  not  be  allowed to  influence  distributive  shares, barring  justification 
through the difference principle – while insisting also that inequalities in natural primary 
goods are not to be compensated for by political authority. (What is more: we hope that 
this discussion also makes it plausible that there is a normatively appealing vision behind 
these views.) We ensure that intelligence and talents do not illegitimately affect social 
primary goods without taking it as required that intelligence and talents themselves be 
equalized or compensated for.
21 What Kymlicka understands as an inconsistency is the 
result of a consistent reading of an indirect model of distributive equality.
22
This discussion highlights how using an indirect model of distributive equality –
mediated  through  the  kind  of  reasoning  that  accompanies  it  -- has  consequences  for 
conclusions  about  justice.    The  differences  in  natural  primary  goods  that  Kymlicka 
highlights  are  not  trivial;  differences  in  natural  endowment  can  represent  important 
differences  in  well-being,  even  when  such  differences  do  not  become  relevant  for 
                                                
21 It should be noted that Rawls briefly adverts, in A Theory of Justice, to a principle of 
redress, on which all natural inequalities might be taken as prima facie unjust and 
therefore deserving of compensation.  This principle, however, is not one Rawls 
consistently endorses; he identifies it only as one possible strand in our shared public 
understanding of justice, and argues that such a principle is best achieved through the 
more constrained conception of justice embodied in the difference principle.  As such, 
while the principle of redress might be understood as a nascent form of direct theorizing, 
it is difficult to ascribe such a principle a significant role in Rawls’s thought.
22  It will be useful, at this stage, to recall the distinction between the continuity and 
discontinuity reading of Rawls that we briefly addressed in the introduction. One may say 
that it is precisely those passages in Rawls that support the continuity reading (and thus 
put Rawls in proximity to responsibility-catering egalitarians) that reappear at this stage 
and support Kymlicka’s inconsistency charge. However, this discussion above should 
make clear how the discontinuity reading that we favor can accommodate those passages 
(in particular Rawls’s talk about “moral arbitrariness” that seems to apply to social and 
natural primary goods indiscriminately).  That is, concerns about natural inequality do 
enter an account of distributive equality, but only in the manner sketched above.  18
positions  and  offices  within  the  basic  structure.    The  adoption  of  an  indirect  model 
represents a considered conviction that not all losses, and not all inequalities, matter for a 
theory  of  justice.    We  seek  to  equalize  benefits  and  burdens  produced  by  political 
community (with benefits and burdens not so produced entering through their effect on 
those that are), so that the authority of political government might be justified; we do not 
seek to equalize burdens and benefits themselves.  Some losses are left to lie where they 
fall, and for others there will be a heavy burden of proof on those who argue that they 
should be in the purview of justice. My lack of talent will only be a matter of concern for 
a theory of justice once that lack begins to affect the goods I am able to acquire in the 
market; considered in itself, it is simply bad luck.  
2.5  The  third  and  for  our  purposes  most  significant  implication  of  our  distinction 
concerns different possibilities for integrating a suitable notion of responsibility into an 
account of distributive justice. Note first, however, that there is nothing internal to either 
direct or indirect accounts of justice per se that compels them to accommodate a notion of 
responsibility, so the reasons for wanting to do so must arise independently. We will see 
below how such reasons arise for Rawls’s indirect account, so here we merely point out 
how they may arise straightforwardly on a direct account. 
For illustrative purposes, suppose first our direct theorist is a welfarist. Welfarists 
make an individual’s claims to distributive shares dependent on factors that do influence 
her  welfare,  but  that  many think  should  not  bear  on  her  distributive  share.  One  key 
example  is the  “expensive  tastes”  problem.  This  problem  involves  an  individual 
deliberately  cultivating  expensive  tastes  and  thereafter  asserting  a  claim  for  greater 19
distributive shares.  Here, however, it is intuitively inappropriate to cater to such desires; 
thus many theorists attempt to construct an account of responsibility in which the agent’s 
deliberate choice to develop these tastes is taken as sufficient reason to deny them as 
sources of egalitarian claims. 
Suppose now our direct theorist is a resourcist. By way of contrast with welfarists, 
resourcists face a fetishism objection: it is not the possession of resources as such that we 
should care about (at least not exclusively), but what resources do for people. Without 
any fault of their own, that is, in a manner that cannot be traced to any voluntary choices 
they made, some people have more needs than most (e.g., handicapped people), while 
others may have acted in ways that make them deserving of more than an “equal” share 
of resources.  Again, the notion of responsibility enters as a means of correcting the 
defects of an egalitarian distribution; here, the fact that the disability is not something for 
which the agent is morally responsible might be used to justify her greater claim upon 
resources.  
Both of these direct theories therefore seem to require corrective criteria to be 
plausible as accounts of distributive justice. Considerations of voluntary choice provide 
such criteria. We can see, then, how it is tied to this notion of voluntary choice that the 
notion  of  responsibility  may  enter  such  accounts.    The  notion  of  responsibility  is 
employed to adjust and improve the egalitarian distribution of the theory in question.  
This brings consideration of responsibility into the heart of our discussions of distributive 
equality.  
To  capture  the  difference  between  direct  and  indirect  theories  as  far  as 
responsibility is concerned, we need to look at the notion of responsibility in a bit more 20
detail.  To  this  end,  recall  Scanlon’s  (1998)  distinction  between  responsibility  as 
attributability and substantive responsibility. “To say that a person is responsible, in this 
sense, for a given action”, says Scanlon explaining the former notion, “is only to say that 
it  is  appropriate to  take  it  as a  basis  of  moral  appraisal of  that person”  (p 248).  As 
opposed  to  that,  judgments  of  substantive  responsibility  “express  substantive  claims 
about what people are required (or (…) not required) to do for each other” (p 248).  The 
two  notions  are  distinct;  Scanlon  denies  that  we  may  always  infer  substantive 
responsibility from the fact of attribution.  The notion of responsibility we are interested 
in for questions of distributive justice is substantive responsibility, where it will be an 
additional  question  whether  that  notion  is  also  tied  to  a  notion  of  responsibility  as 
attributability.  In  the  welfarist  and  resourcist  cases  just  discussed  judgments  of 
substantive responsibility are tied to judgments of responsibility as attributability, and the 
latter is flashed out in terms of voluntary choice.  
More generally, on the direct model, substantive responsibility can enter in two 
ways. First, it can enter as a defeating condition: if individuals freely choose to engage 
in activities resulting in a shortfall of the designated good, that shortfall can legitimately 
be ascribed to  them.  It no  longer represents an  injustice,  but  “a matter  of individual 
responsibility;”  a  matter  of  choice,  instead  of  circumstance.  Here,  the  individual  is 
substantively  responsible  for  the  shortfall;  the  apparent  deviation  from  equality  is 
excused in virtue of its connection with voluntary choice.  Conversely, if an individual 
can argue that she does not have responsibility for some shortfall, she may have a claim 
to be compensated. An individual with an unchosen handicap, for instance, may have a 
claim to additional resources, given the fact that she is not responsible for her condition.  21
In both  cases,  considerations  of  responsibility  motivate  why an  individual  would  get 
more or less than others.  The second way of integrating substantive responsibility into a 
direct  theory  is  by  means  of  the  very  concept  of  an  equal  share  itself.  Imagine,  for 
example,  that  individuals  are  given  an  adequate  supply  of  cash,  which  some  rash 
individuals  choose  to  burn.    We  might  resist  their  claims  for  compensation  not 
immediately through the concept of choice and circumstance, but simply by noting that 
they have indeed been given the equal share required; their foolish choice does not negate 
the fact that we provided what was morally demanded.  Here, responsibility does not 
enter  in  a  way  that  justifies  deviations from  the  standard  of  equal  shares;  it  enters, 
instead, by way of modifying what counts as an equal share to begin with. 
In both cases, however, substantive responsibility is integrated into an account of 
distributive justice by way of qualifying the direct inference from equality of persons to 
the equality of their distributive shares (or, if the respective direct account is one that 
postulates  distributive  equality  axiomatically,  by  way of  modifying  what  precisely  is 
postulated). Again, in both cases it will, logically speaking, be an additional question of 
whether  judgments  of  substantive  responsibility  are  tied  to  responsibility  as 
attributability. In the welfarist and resourcist case discussed above, this was the case, and 
responsibility as attributability was understood in terms of voluntariness. This is typical 
of common versions of direct accounts of distributive justice. What is crucial now is that 
these are the only two ways in which substantive responsibility could be integrated into a 
direct account of distributive justice.
23
                                                
23 Within different theories, of course, substantive responsibility will be understood in 
different ways.  Dworkin (2000), for instance, holds people responsible only for choices 
that derive from preferences with which they identify. Cohen (1989) and Arneson (1989) 22
As opposed to this – and this is the central point of difference between direct and 
indirect models, as far as responsibility is concerned -- the indirect model can make room 
for  substantive  responsibility  within  a  theory  of  distributive  justice  in  a  markedly 
different  way,  one  that  not  only  entirely  disconnects  judgments  of  substantive 
responsibility  from  responsibility  as  attributability,  but  also  utilizes  the  structure  of 
indirect theories. (To be clear: the intimate connection between substantive responsibility 
and responsibility as attributability is a typical feature of direct theories, which tend to 
spell  out  attributability  in  terms  of  voluntariness  in  the  manner  of  the  welfarist  and 
recourcist considered earlier; this connection is, however, not logically required for direct 
theories. The logically crucial difference stems from the fact that indirect theorists can 
introduce a notion of substantive responsibility that makes use of the structure of their 
theories.) The indirect model does not license the inference to distributive equally unless 
the  relevant  individuals  stand  in  certain  normatively  important  relationships.  Indirect 
theorists  can  make  room  for  substantive  responsibility  by  way  of  fleshing  out  those 
relationships, and therefore they can obtain a notion of substantive responsibility that is 
neither available nor will seem plausible to direct theorists. A paradigmatic relationship
of that sort is that of being jointly involved in a system of fair cooperation over time, a 
system whose members are free and equal citizens.  Substantive responsibility  can be 
integrated into this kind of indirect model by way of developing this idea of a system of 
fair cooperation among free and equal citizens. 
                                                                                                                                                
locate the cut differently, advocating that individuals be held responsible for choices they 
have made in awareness of their consequences. And Roemer (1996) thinks that people 
should be held responsible only for those choices that similarly situated others would 
have avoided.23
This is very abstract, but how concerns of responsibility can be integrated into 
indirect models is best fleshed out within that indirect theory with which we are primarily 
concerned,  that  is,  Rawls’s  theory.  In  section  3  we  will  first  develop  the  notion  of 
responsibility within Rawls’s theory (which will make clear what we mean by saying that 
“indirect theorists can make room for substantive responsibility by way of fleshing out 
those  normatively  important  relationships”),  and  then  examine  two  of  the  most 
sophisticated critiques of Rawls by those who charge him with an inadequate notion of 
responsibility,  namely,  Richard  Arneson  and  John  Roemer.    We  claim  that  both  are 
committed to a direct theory of distributive equality, as well as to a version of this stance 
that ties responsibility as attributability to substantive responsibility. Therefore Rawls, as 
an  indirect  theorist  who  disengages  substantive  responsibility  from  responsibility  as 
attributability, is not susceptible to their criticisms. 
Rawls’s indirect theory offers resources to develop a distinctly political notion of 
substantive responsibility that has little to do with the moral notion of responsibility as 
attributability,  and  that  is  neither  open  to  nor  will  be  otherwise  plausible  to  direct 
theorists. While there may be good reasons for adopting a direct model of distributive 
justice, one cannot argue for such a model merely by showing that the indirect model 
does not fit with our moral account of responsibility.  The indirect model does not even 
try  to  fit  such  a  notion,  since  it  must  develop  a  distinct  account  of  responsibility 
appropriate to the development of principles sufficient to ensure and justify the ongoing 
project of social cooperation.
3. “A Social Division of Responsibility”24
3.1 A discussion of responsibility is notoriously absent from Rawls’s Theory. Yet while 
responsibility  never  gains  much  prominence  on  his  agenda,  Rawls  does  offer  the 
following account in several subsequent essays (emphasis added): 
This  conception  [of  justice]  includes  what  we  may  call  a  social  division  of 
responsibility: society, the citizens as a collective body, accepts the responsibility 
for maintaining the equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and for 
providing  a  fair  share  of  the  other  primary  goods  for  everyone  within  this 
framework,  while  citizens  (as  individuals)  and  associations  accept  the 
responsibility for revising and adjusting their ends and aspirations in view of the 
all-purpose means they can expect, given their present and foreseeable situation.
24
Rawls claims that this understanding of responsibility is implicit in the choice of primary 
goods. That claim is puzzling. One may have thought that the issue of what “currency” to 
choose for distributive justice (with e.g., welfare, resources, and capabilities competing 
with primary goods) is both conceptually prior to and independent of how responsibility 
is  divided  between  individuals  and  society.  We  will  have  taken  a  big  step towards 
understanding Rawls’s account of responsibility and its place within his theory once we 
understand his claim that this account is implicit in the choice of primary goods. 
                                                
24 This quote is from “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” Rawls (1999b), p 371; see also 
“Fairness to Goodness,” Rawls (1999b), p 284, “Reply to Alexander and Musgrave,” 
Rawls (1999b), p 241, “A Kantian Conception of Equality,” Rawls (1999b), p 261; see 
also “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,” Rawls (1999b), p 407. Two 
questions that arise here is to what extent Rawls’s theory might have changed between 
the view presented in Theory and his subsequent writings, and, by way of approaching 
that question, whether the “social division of responsibility” that appears in these later 
writings fits completely comfortably with everything that Rawls says in Theory. We will, 
however, not pursue these points here any further.  25
Interestingly,  we  get  to  the  same  question  when  studying  Scanlon’s  (1998) 
discussion of Rawls’s account. Scanlon asks why the parties in the original position can 
reasonably make their choice of principles of justice in terms of expectations. Reminding 
the reader that, for Rawls, “the choice of primary goods as a measure of expectations 
amounts to a certain ‘social division of responsibility’ between social institutions (…) 
and individuals,” Scanlon explains: 
The  idea  is  this:  The  ‘basic  structure’  of  society  is  its  legal,  political,  and 
economic  framework,  the  function  of  which  is  to  define  positions  to  which 
different powers and economic rewards are attached. If a basic structure does this 
in an acceptable way – if citizens have no reasonable complaint about their access 
to various positions within this framework or to the package of rights, liberties, 
and opportunities for economic reward that particular positions present them with 
– then  that  structure  is  just.  It  is  up  to  individuals,  operating  within  this 
framework, to choose their own ends and make use of the given opportunities and 
resources to pursue those ends as best they can. How successful, unsuccessful, 
happy or unhappy they are as a result is their own responsibility. (p 244) 
What is puzzling is this. Plausibly it is the choice of the principles of justice that 
makes for a society that assures individuals of a basic stock of primary goods. Yet the 
principles can be chosen only after Scanlon’s question has been settled, namely, why the 
parties can reasonably make their decisions in  terms of  expectations. Only after it is 
decided that primary goods are the “currency” and after parties in the original position 
have started to think of their choice in terms of expectations of such goods can they select 
principles. Scanlon can talk the way he does only if the choice of primary goods already 26
amounts to a “social division of responsibility.” For then his answer to the question he 
raises does not depend on the availability of the principles of justice at that conceptually 
earlier stage. But then again we must ask: what does it mean that the choice of primary 
goods amounts to this division? 
3.2 To answer this question, we must revisit the core idea of Rawls’s theory. “The most 
fundamental idea in this conception of justice,” so Rawls (2001) tells us, “is the idea of 
society as a fair system of social cooperation over time” (p 5). The participants of this 
system are considered free and equal, each with his or her own life to live, but also living 
together. They are regarded as equal in the sense that they are capable of engaging in 
social cooperation over a complete life as one among equal citizens. They are considered 
free in the sense that they regard both themselves and each other as having a conception 
of the good, and as entitled to making claims on their political institutions to be in a 
position to advance their respective conception of the good (provided those conceptions 
are in accordance with the conception of justice). Such a system of cooperation aims to 
realize appropriate conceptions of freedom and equality simultaneously. 
Such a system can exist over time only if, first, the possession of certain goods is 
regulated in such a manner that the fairness of the interaction and the participants’ status 
as free and equal citizens is maintained over time, and this leads to social primary goods 
as the metric of distributive justice: those are the sorts of goods participants need to this 
end. (This regulation will entail in particular that each citizen has an appropriate share of 
these goods, goods that individuals “need as citizens,” Rawls (2001), section 17.) Second, 
such a system can exist over time only if it is the responsibility of citizens as a collective 27
body to  assume  responsibility  for organizing  the  basic structure  in  such  a way as  to 
support such a system of cooperation. Otherwise, the aggregative effect of individual 
decisions may, over time, undermine the status of some participants as free and equal 
citizens.  (Think  of  certain  forms  of  capitalist  free  markets  without  noticeable 
redistributive efforts: the workings of the market may bring it about over time that some 
participants  are  no  longer  free  and  equal.)  Third,  cooperation  can  remain  fair,  and 
individuals free and equal, only if they do not, beyond reasonable limits, burden others 
with the costs of their decisions. Individuals must take responsibility for their ends before 
the background of a collective responsibility for the maintenance of the justice of the 
basic structure. As Rawls (1993) explains: 
[V]ariations in preferences and tastes are seen  as our own responsibility. (…) 
[T]hat we can take responsibility for our ends is part of what free citizens may 
expect  of  one  another.  Taking  responsibility  for  our  tastes  and  preferences, 
whether or not they have arisen from our actual choices, is a special case of that 
responsibility. As citizens with realized moral powers, this is something we must 
learn to deal with. (p 185) 
That  is,  individuals  will  have  to  take  substantive  responsibility  for  their  tastes  and 
preferences regardless of whether these tastes and preferences can also be attributed to 
them and are thus their responsibility also in that sense – or that is, will have to do so 
before  the  background  of  a  basic  structure  whose  social  positions  are  regulated  by 
Rawls’s two principles. Responsibility as attributability, on this account, does not bear on 
substantive responsibility. As Scheffler (2003) puts the point: 28
People are asked to accept responsibility for their ends, in Rawls’s sense, not 
because the metaphysics of the will makes it fitting that people should bear the 
costs of their choices, but rather because it is reasonable to expect people to make 
do with their fair shares. (p 27/8)
The second and third point (in terms of the enumeration in the second paragraph 
of this subsection) deliver Rawls’s division of responsibility. This account is implicit in 
the choice of primary goods in the sense that both the former and the latter are essential 
to the conception of society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens 
over time. What accounts for the choice of primary goods as “currency” is precisely what 
also  accounts  for  the  endorsement  of  a  social  division  of  responsibility,  namely,  the 
concern to maintain such a system of fair cooperation, which in turn depends on both 
those  components. For  Rawls,  then,  contrary  to  what  seemed  plausible  above,  the 
question of the “currency” of justice does not arise conceptually prior to or independently 
of  the  question  of  who  is  responsible  for  what.  Both  questions  are  answered 
simultaneously,  by  way  of explicating  the  system  of  fair  cooperation  at  the  core  of 
Rawls’s theory. This makes also clear why for Rawls social justice does not reduce to 
distributive justice conceived narrowly in terms of who should have what.
25
                                                
25  This subsection has progressed without mentioning the original position, but the latter 
can easily be integrated into this account. The original position is a device of 
representation by which we may determine what must be the case for a political society 
to be justified in its use of coercion.  Individuals are precluded from knowing their class, 
plan of life, or genetic endowment; the principles derived under conditions of ignorance 
are deemed justified by the absence of any information which might represent illegitimate 
bases of argumentation. The original position is intended, through what sources of 
reasons it excludes, to model those forms of reason we think could be accepted as 
reasonable bases of agreement between free and equal persons. It is supposed to model 
what reasons we can legitimately provide in the justification of coercion.  On such an 
indirect model, the ordinary moral notion of responsibility will not directly enter into an 29
Compare this outlook with Cohen’s (1989) claim that “the primary egalitarian 
impulse is to extinguish the influence on distribution of both exploitation and brute luck,” 
where “[a] person is exploited when unfair advantage is taken of him, and he suffers from 
(bad) brute luck when his bad luck is not the result of a gamble or risk which he could 
have avoided” (p 908). While concerns about exploitation and brute luck do have their 
place within the conception of responsibility developed here, they do so derivatively of 
the general idea of maintaining a society as a fair system of cooperation, rather than by 
way of capturing a “primary egalitarian impulse.” 
3.3  Thus  tied  to  Rawls’s  notion  of  a  fair  system  of  cooperation,  his  notion  of 
responsibility is designed to govern the assignment of burdens within such a system. As 
more information about society becomes available, this conception of responsibility also 
guides the choice of a constitution, then the design of laws, and, ultimately, the outcomes 
of adjudication. All of these steps are constrained by the demand that society remain a 
fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens. Individuals take responsibility 
for their actions within the framework thus determined, which means they benefit from or 
assume the burdens of their choices within those constraints. 
This account of Rawls’s social division of responsibility should explain our claim 
that indirect theorists can make room for substantive responsibility by way of fleshing out 
the normatively important relationships whose presence they require to license inferences 
to distributive equality. For Rawls, these relationships are those of jointly participating in 
                                                                                                                                                
account of justice. We must ask, instead, about what forms of individual responsibility 
are relevant from the standpoint of the justification of political coercion.  30
a fair system of cooperation, and it is features of that system that allow him to make room 
for a notion of responsibility. This notion of responsibility does not satisfy the demands 
on such a notion that arise in moral philosophy,
26 and it does not gain its respectability 
through being embeddable into an overall plausible account of the free-will problem; it is, 
in particular, not reducible to notions of responsibility current in that context, such as 
responsibility drawing on causal involvement and responsibility drawing on voluntary 
choice. The Rawlsian notion of responsibility cannot play such roles, as much as these 
moral conceptions are unsuitable to ensure that burdens are distributed in a manner that 
guarantees the continuation of fair cooperation among free and equal citizens. 
The fact that primary goods are chosen because they are what persons need as free 
and equal citizens entails that moral responsibility should not be required and not be able 
to influence an individual’s guaranteed share and thus her substantive responsibility. Just 
as the sort of respect individuals are due according to the Kantian moral law is not the 
sort of respect they must earn or of which they must show themselves worthy, so in the 
Rawlsian system, individuals receive shares of primary goods without needing to show 
themselves worthy or deserving of it. There is no room for a full-fledged notion of desert 
to enter Rawls’s theory in a way that influences individuals’ distributive shares, nor is 
there such room for a notion of responsibility as attributability.  There is no need for the 
addition of such notions either.
27
4. Criticizing Rawls on Responsibility, One: Arneson
                                                
26  This point is also emphasized in Schaller (1997). 
27  Cf. Rawls (2001), section 20, on desert.  31
4.1 Richard Arneson has been concerned to argue, in a variety of contexts, that Rawls’s 
principles of justice are inadequately sensitive to choice.  Over the last decade and a half, 
he has defended welfarist  accounts of egalitarian justice against Rawls and Dworkin. 
These  efforts  were  accompanied  by  an  exploration  of  ways  in  which  the  notion  of 
responsibility could be integrated into a theory of distributive justice. In his publications 
around 1990 Arneson held a desire-satisfaction account of welfare (cf. Arneson (1989), 
(1990a), (1990b)). This account entered into his theory of equality of opportunity for 
welfare, which also brought to bear his ideas about responsibility on distributive justice 
(cf. Arneson (1989), (1991)). Arneson’s more recent writings endorse an objective-list 
account of welfare,  rejecting equality of opportunity  for what he  calls  responsibility-
catering prioritarianism (inspired by Parfit (1998) and related work; cf. Arneson (1999a), 
(2000b),  and  (2001)).
28 Arneson’s  extensive  criticism  of  Rawls  draws  on  both  his 
welfarist commitments and his concern to find an appropriate place for responsibility 
within an egalitarian account of justice, and this concern is our subject now. 
While it has taken on different forms over the years, one recurring critique is that 
Rawls’s difference principle misallocates social primary goods by ignoring the morally 
relevant distinction between choice and circumstance.  In particular, Rawls’s vision of 
distributive justice illegitimately penalizes people for disabilities or innate preferences 
not properly understood as aspects of choice; it will treat such unchosen aspects of the 
person as if they were chosen.  According to Arneson, this demonstrates that Rawls’s 
                                                
28 Prioritarians are unified by demanding special consideration for those who are least 
well-off, according to the given metric. 32
vision  of  responsibility  is  inappropriate  for  a  theory  of  distributive  justice.  We  will 
discuss this criticism first, and then, in 4.4, turn to a second one. 
The particular version of the objection we consider is set within the context of a 
discussion of employment (cf. Arneson (1990b)). Arneson explores whether a program 
guaranteeing  access  to  productive  employment  could  replace  a  program  guaranteeing 
direct access to money and wealth.  He notes that a program focusing on productive 
employment may illegitimately discriminate against those who have an innate aversion to 
wage labor and employment: among the class of persons who are both disadvantaged and 
unemployed,  some  will  have  a  pronounced  taste  for  leisure,  so  that  their  welfare 
prospects would not be enhanced by egalitarian provision of employment opportunities.  
These persons can be labeled needy bohemians.  From a welfare-egalitarian standpoint, 
the policy of offering aid to the disadvantaged in the form of job opportunities rather than 
cash transfers  is  a  good  idea only if  the desirable  effect of  screening  out  non-needy 
bohemians (who should not be targeted by welfare programs) from the policy outweighs 
the undesirable effect of screening out needy bohemians (who should be).
4.2  This  discussion  does not  by itself pose  an objection to  Rawls.  It  does,  however, 
represent a clear difference between Rawls and Arneson as regards the ways in which 
responsibility enters into discussions of distributive justice. Arneson’s welfare-egalitarian 
contention  is  that  needy  bohemians,  who have  an  unchosen  aversion  to  waged  labor 
ought not to be penalized for their antipathy towards work: the fact that they would be 
screened out by a measure that offers state-guaranteed employment instead of financial 
aid speaks against such a measure. To put this point in Scanlon’s terms: needy bohemians 33
should not be held substantively responsible for their apathy towards work because this 
apathy is not attributable to them. 
As we saw in section 3, for Rawls judgments of attributability do not bear on 
substantive judgments. The difference principle, which governs the allocation of primary 
goods to productive social and political positions, does not even attempt to distinguish 
needy bohemians from those who freely choose to avoid work.  Having an aversion to 
work is insufficient to justify compensation; even if it is inborn, and thus part of an 
individual’s  set  of  background  circumstances.  On  Rawls’s  account,  individuals  must 
adjust their plans of life to those that can be justified through the use of practical reason, 
or else bear the costs herself.
29  On Arneson’s welfare-egalitarian account, this gets it 
backwards: society must adjust itself so as to ensure that unchosen preferences do not 
penalize individuals in the distribution of goods. Arneson, that is, ties responsibility as 
attributability to substantive responsibility.
30
Arneson’s account is an instantiation of the direct model of distributive justice.  
Where there is an inequality in what goods individuals possess, we have – on a direct 
account such as Arneson’s – good reason to think that an objectionable inequality exists. 
(The “goods” here are individual welfare levels.)  The notion of responsibility, on this 
                                                
29 See Rawls (1999b), p 368.
30  Arneson (1997) makes a similar point: “A person who is very talented and possesses 
desirable traits such as charm and gregariousness may have a decided and steady 
preference for leisure over money-making activity, and may adopt a plan of life that 
involves voluntary avoidance of such activity. Even though his bank account wealth and 
income are low, he is living well, but Rawlsian justice lumps him together with the 
desperately poor who are barely able to find marginal employment and scrape by” 
(Arneson (1997), p 4). Later Arneson (1997) summarizes his point by saying that “[t]he 
difference principle mixes together deep and shallow inequalities promiscuously” (p 5).34
account, enters as a defeating condition: what prima facie seemed like an injustice turns 
out not to be one once an appropriate appeal to responsibility is made. By the same token, 
since such a defeating condition does not apply to Arneson’s needy bohemian, she cannot
be held responsible for her plight –and a plausible theory of distributive justice must 
ensure that such an individual is not disadvantaged by her condition.
4.3 This is a coherent vision of distributive justice.  The difficulty we seek to address is 
when the notion of responsibility animating this vision is taken to defeat the distributive 
conclusions of an indirect theorist such as Rawls.  To take Arneson’s needy bohemian as 
an objection to Rawls is to wrench a direct notion of responsibility out of context, and use 
it against a theory over which it has no purchase.  
Arneson contends that the needy bohemian deserves compensation – deserves, 
that is, to be treated in the distributive realm no worse than individuals whose unchosen 
preferences lead to productive employment.  Yet according to indirect theorists, we must 
ask not simply whether the individual is responsible for her preferences, but whether she 
can use these preferences legitimately to press claims against others.  The standpoint of 
an  indirect  theorist  such  as  Rawls  is  that  we  must  determine  principles  by  which  a 
constitutional democracy could justify its political coercion to all those who face it.  In 
determining whether such principles mandate treating the needy bohemian in the manner 
recommended by Arneson, we must ask whether there is anything in this construction 
demanding such treatment.    It seems, however, that there is no such demand.  On a 
treatment such as Rawls’s, the desire to spend one’s life in an unproductive pursuit – to 
avoid  employment  benefiting  the  society  as  a  whole,  as  part  of  a  system  of  social 35
cooperation – is like a demand to free ride on the efforts of others.  It represents an 
attempt to gain the benefits of cooperation without providing any benefits.
31
Rawls’s notion of a social division of responsibility supports the idea that some 
disadvantages remain the responsibility of individuals.  Individuals maintain the freedom 
to evaluate and pursue a plan of life, but within the range of such plans compatible with 
the cooperative system advantaging all members of society. Individuals whose natural 
disposition is geared towards productive labor will find this requirement easy to meet.  
Individuals who do not have this disposition, like the needy bohemians, bear the burden 
of adjusting their plans to those that might be justified to others through the process of 
public reason.  Yet this inequality in costs does not have to be ameliorated by society.
32  
                                                
31 One may say that what counts as free-riding will vary depending upon social norms; 
we might encounter norms permitting certain individuals to receive compensation while 
avoiding market-based labor.  This is correct; what counts as free-riding is not a 
descriptive question, but a normative one, and we must admit that the precise contours of 
such norms may admit of more than one answer.  Our point, however, persists; the mere 
fact of having an unchosen preference against productive labor does not, on an indirect 
theory, mandate compensation.  The question of compensation looks not to what is 
chosen, but to what can be justified to others.  That the latter question is likely to prove 
complex does not mean that it is not, for an indirect theorist, the correct one to ask.
32 This explains, further, why Arneson could not rephrase his notion of equality of 
opportunity for welfare as something which might be chosen behind the veil of ignorance 
and, therefore, as an indirect theory.  If a given division of welfare is depicted as 
something we might choose together – rather than a direct implication of the moral nature 
of welfare - then it is no longer the case that we can simply use the moral notion of 
responsibility to work out what distributive shares are deserved.  We must, instead, seek a 
distinctively political reason for determining which sorts of distribution will lead to 
political demands.  It is conceivable that Arneson’s notion of equality of opportunity for 
welfare might be the end result of some such political process; but, in this case, the 
reasons for valuing the distribution would be quite different than Arneson’s own.  To 
transform Arneson’s egalitarianism from direct theory to indirect theory, in other words, 
would be to undercut his arguments against Rawls, which rely upon a non-political notion 
of moral responsibility.  We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this Journal for 
pressing this objection against our position.36
It is the responsibility of individuals to adjust their preferences so that their participation 
within that system does not become the functional equivalent of a decision to defect.
33
4.4  What  we  have  discussed  so  far  is  Arneson’s  criticism  that  Rawls’s  difference 
principle misallocates social primary goods by not giving proper weight to responsibility.  
However,  Arneson’s  work  contains  a  second  line  of  criticizing  Rawls’s  treatment  of 
responsibility.    According  to  this  objection,  to  the  extent  that  Rawls  does  integrate 
responsibility (an extent that is, according to the first objection, too small), he does so in 
an  implausible  and  possibly  inconsistent  way.  Arneson  objects  to  Rawls’s  “social 
division  of  responsibility”  on  two  grounds.  On  the  one  hand  this  account  is  hard  to 
combine with the absence of responsibility from the difference principle: if individuals 
are  responsible  for  their  ends,  why  does  Rawls  not hold  them  responsible  for  being 
among the least advantaged (cf. Arneson (1990a), (1997))? Here, so Arneson suggests, 
Rawls  comes  at  least  close  to  presenting  an  inconsistent  theory.  On  the  other  hand, 
Arneson argues that this idea is too demanding and thus implausible. His endorsement of 
                                                
33 It is important to note, here, that Rawls’s position and Arneson’s may in practice lead 
to similar results.  Both will insist that individuals who can choose to alter their plans of 
life to fit the requirements of cooperation will have to do so.  Rawls might, further, allow 
some cases of truly pathological aversion to work to count as a disability, and consider 
such people as falling outside the set of persons understood as functioning members of 
society; this part of Rawls, we should note, is underdeveloped and in need of fleshing out 
– see Nussbaum (2006) for an analysis of these issues.  The primary difference here is not 
with such rare and extreme cases, but with the more ordinary cases, in which the costs of 
altering one’s plans of life are significant but not debilitating.  Arneson would regard a 
superable but significant aversion to work as a significant moral factor, one which is 
deserving of compensation; Rawls, in contrast, would regard such an aversion as simply a 
matter of bad luck – something one must overcome in order to stand in mutually 
justifiable political relationships with others.  Here, again, the difference is one of 
philosophical methodology, rather than political conclusion.  We are grateful to an editor 
of this Journal for pressing us to be more specific on this point.37
individuals’  responsibility  for  their  ends  commits  Rawls  to  “individualism  with  a 
vengeance,” depriving his theory of any possibility to consider “predictably blighted lives 
of some of its least fortunate members” (Arneson (1997), p 16) as being within its scope.
Let us begin with the inconsistency version. An inconsistency arises only if one 
thinks about Rawls’s division of responsibility as if it involved a notion of responsibility 
drawing on voluntariness, that is, a notion of responsibility as attributability. For then 
Rawls would have to explain why voluntariness is decisive for the assignment of costs 
and benefits in some contexts, but not in others. The mere insistence that, in the one case 
we talk about the basic structure and in the other about actions occurring within society 
may not satisfy the critic. For once it is assumed that what individuals have claims to is 
determined by their own features (“what they have chosen voluntarily”) it may seem 
bizarre that the domain in which their choices occur should make a difference. 
Yet this perspective is alien to the core of justice as fairness. The point of justice 
as fairness is to distribute burdens in such a manner that a fair system of cooperation 
among free and equal citizens is preserved, which requires a division of responsibility as 
suggested  by  Rawls.  No  inconsistency  arises,  and  one  would  think  so  only  if  one 
endorses a direct theory of distributive equality.  Rawls’s theory, in other words, does not 
begin  with  the  idea  of  moral  responsibility,  and  then  adapt  it  to  politics;  he  begins, 
instead, with a political notion of what can be justified to free and equal citizens, and then 
develops a conception of responsibility specifically designed to work within this political 
theory of justice.  The more ordinary notion of moral responsibility may be relevant in 
this  process,  but  it  need  not  always  be  so;  we  may  not,  therefore,  infer  any  moral 38
inconsistency when Rawls’s  political  notion of responsibility runs afoul of the moral 
notion animating Arneson’s own conception.
What about the implausibility version of Arneson’s objection? Is it appropriate, 
within a theory of justice, to hold people responsible for ends, or does Rawls not thereby 
assign responsibility a function it cannot plausibly have? One way of questioning whether 
individuals should be held responsible for their ends appears in Arneson (1997): 
[T]he distinction between inequalities arising from choice and inequalities arising 
from  unchosen  circumstances  turns  out  to  be  confused,  because  unchosen 
circumstances  include  each  individual’s  talent  endowment,  and  among  one’s 
talents  are  talents  to  make  and  implement  good  choices  in  formulating  a 
conception of the good and devising a plan of life. (p 14)
So by holding individuals responsible for their ends we indulge in the illusion that there 
is a “genuine choice” unaffected by factors that may deprive them of that responsibility. 
Yet since there is no such choice, this view amounts to individualism with a vengeance. 
The response must be, once more, that the problem arises only if one thinks about 
the Rawlsian conception of responsibility as if it were a notion of responsibility drawing 
on voluntariness. If what individuals have legitimate claims to depends on their voluntary 
choices, it is easy to see how this would amount to individualism with a vengeance. That 
notion  of  responsibility,  however,  is  Arneson’s,  not  Rawls’s,  and  he  and  other 
responsibility-catering egalitarians have been taken to task for it in Anderson (1999). The 
Rawlsian system, to use a formulation due to Ripstein (1999), is based on the idea that 
“equality  and  responsibility  need  to  be  understood  together,  in  light  of  the  idea  of 39
reciprocity” (p 21).
34 Before this background, “individualism with a vengeance” must be 
seen as  a phenomenon  rather alien to  Rawls’s  theory. Such vengeance  is  a threat to 
responsibility-catering egalitarianism that uses a choice-based notion of responsibility. 
4.5 There are some difficulties in these answers to Arneson.  The first is the distinction 
between disability and  expensive  preference.    Individuals  with  disabilities  preventing 
them  from  participation  in  productive  employment  are  guaranteed  compensation  and 
resource shares on Rawls’s account.  There is a relevant difference between those who 
cannot work, and those who prefer not to work.
35  Nonetheless, it must be recognized that 
this line may be difficult to draw in particular cases.  Rawls assumes that individuals will 
be  able  to  adjust  their  preferences  to  productive pursuits,  while  the  disabled  will  be 
unable to adjust their circumstances to permit employment.  In the majority of cases, this 
assumption will be correct.  The distinction, nonetheless, might prove problematic.  A 
further difficulty is found in the notion of productive employment itself.  What counts as 
cooperation – what counts as productive employment – is not an empirical question, but a 
normative question.  As such, it admits of different answers.
36  Whether the competitive 
market is an adequate guide to those forms of pursuit providing benefits to others is a 
                                                
34  This is actually what Ripstein (1999) says is the “central theme” of the book. 
35 Goodin (1985) insists that, on theories making use of the idea of society as a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage, those too weak to participate productively 
must rationally be excluded from membership in the community.  As applied to Rawls, 
this seems to us inaccurate; members of political community who are unable to work 
because of unchosen disability are nonetheless entitled to have the political coercion they 
face justified to them – a process of justification which may involve a model such as that
developed by Rawls.  See Goodin (1985) p. 156.
36 Cf. Waring (1990). 40
question we cannot address here.  Nevertheless, such a question must be answered for 
indirect theories such as Rawls’s to be acceptable.
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5. Criticizing Rawls on Responsibility, Two: Roemer
5.1 Like Arneson, John Roemer has developed a series of criticisms of Rawls’s concept 
of responsibility.  The one we examine deals with questions of effort and desert. Roemer 
takes his arguments (in conjunction with objections to Dworkin and Harsanyi) to entail
that  veil-of-ignorance  arguments  do  not  support  egalitarian  conclusions,  advising 
egalitarians  not  to  use  the  veil-of-ignorance  devise.  We  have  nothing  to  say  about 
Roemer’s  arguments  against  Dworkin  and  Harsanyi,  but  argue  that  Rawlsians  can 
maintain the connection between the veil of ignorance and egalitarian conclusions. The 
                                                
37 What about Arneson’s (1997) point that “[t]he difference principle mixes together deep 
and shallow inequalities promiscuously” (p 5), where “deep” inequalities are beyond the 
individuals’ control (and thus not their responsibility), whereas “shallow” inequalities are 
due to voluntary choice (and thus are)? Curiously, Rawls also talks about “deep 
inequalities,” insisting that it is such inequalities to which his principles of justice apply 
in the first instance (Rawls (1999a), p 7). What Rawls counts as deep inequalities are 
inequalities arising from unequal starting positions. Regulating such inequalities is the 
target of Rawls’s theory. “Shallow” inequalities then are those not due to unequal starting 
points, but, presumably, due to the actions of individuals in a manner that cannot be 
account for by a reduction to unequal starting points. Rawls’s distinction between deep 
and shallow inequalities is at odds with Arneson’s, which is drawn in terms of the 
voluntariness of actions: “shallow” inequalities are those due to voluntary actions and 
require no redress, whereas “deep” in inequalities are due to circumstances not brought 
about by voluntary actions and thus do. The Rawlsian distinction between inequalities 
arising because of the socio-economic constitution of society and inequalities arising 
because of individual actions within such structures is ill-captured in terms of voluntary 
and involuntary actions. For if inequalities arise because of unequal staring points, they 
do so regardless of whether they are maintained by voluntary or involuntary actions. The 
language of voluntariness ignores that concern. The domain of Rawlsian principles of 
justice are institutions, rather than individual actions. Institutions, unlike actions, are ill-
assessed in terms of the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary. As far as 
principles of justice for the basic structure are concerned, that distinction does little work.41
work will be done, once again, by the distinction between direct and indirect accounts of 
distributive equality. 
Where Arneson contests that Rawls illegitimately punishes people for unchosen 
unproductive plans of life, Roemer is concerned that Rawls’s refusal to regard effort as 
giving rise to desert fails to give people proper credit for freely chosen decisions to work 
hard.  This contention is expressed by a comparison between effort and plans of life:
[Rawls] assumes that individuals do not know their life plans behind the veil of 
ignorance, although we may suppose they know the joint distributions of such life 
plans and all other resources.  But if life plans are not morally arbitrary, then why 
should individuals in the morally correct posture for making the social contract 
not know them?  And why should they not know their propensities to expend 
effort, or, rather, that part of effort for which individuals are morally responsible?  
After  all,  the  veil  of  ignorance  is  only  supposed  to  shield  individuals  from 
knowledge of their morally arbitrary features. (Roemer (1996), 175-176)   
This critique is best understood in terms of Rawls’s notion of responsibility.  Both 
plans of life and knowledge about effort are hidden in the original position.  Yet why 
should we hide from individuals the knowledge about their propensity for effort, where 
that  effort  is  the  result  of  free  choice?    Rawls  seems  guilty  of  falsely  ascribing  to 
circumstance what  should  be  understood  as  free  choice,  thereby  refusing  to  credit 
individuals  for  choices  for  which  they  actually  are  responsible.  Roemer  insists  that 
individuals should know their life plans behind the veil. But if so, says he, many will 
reject the difference principle. So Rawls must drop either the claim that the veil admits all 42
and only morally relevant information (depriving it of its purpose), or he else his claim 
that the original position offers an impartial viewpoint delivering egalitarian conclusions. 
5.2  This  critique,  like  Arneson’s,  rests  on  an  assumption  that  the  relevant  notion  of 
responsibility  is  one  found  within  the  direct  model  of  distributive  equality.    It  is  an 
attempt to read the direct model back into Rawls’s original position.  Whatever is morally 
arbitrary, on this reading of Rawls, cannot serve to ground a difference in the allocation 
of goods.  The critique charges that Rawls is inconsistent in his handling of plans of life 
and effort; if both are morally arbitrary, neither can justify inequalities in distributive 
shares.  Since effort at least partly represents free choice, Rawls errs by refusing to give 
individuals  credit  for  these  choices.    Respecting  individuals,  for  Roemer,  means 
compensating them for choices for which they are morally understood as responsible.
Yet the original position is not designed to eliminate all aspects of the person for 
which we cannot claim  responsibility.   It is  not  a replication or formalization  of the 
ordinary notion of moral responsibility.  It is, instead, used to generate principles that 
could legitimately govern cooperation. As Rawls says,  
[w]e must specify a point of view from which a fair agreement between free and 
equal persons can be reached; but this point of view must be removed from and 
not distorted by the particular features and circumstances of the existing basic 
structure. (Rawls (2001), p 15)
He goes on to explain: 
In the original position, the parties are not allowed to know the social positions or 
the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they represent.  They also 43
do not know persons’ race and ethnic group, sex, or various native endowments 
such as strength and intelligence, all within the normal range. We express these 
limits  on  information  figuratively  by  saying  the  parties  are  behind  a  veil  of 
ignorance” (Rawls (2001), p 15; cf. Rawls (1999a), sec. 24; Rawls (1993), p 24f). 
Crucially, the language of morally arbitrary features is ill-suited to depict the purpose of 
the original position. For the original position serves to capture conditions under which 
an agreement about principles governing a system of fair cooperation can be reached.  It 
is not simply a way of spelling out the moral notion of responsibility for choice; it is, 
instead, a method for working out principles for fair political agreement – and the notion 
of responsibility it implies is internal to this task, rather than something derived from our 
moral general ideas of moral responsibility.
One’s plan of life, on this analysis, is not best described through the idea of moral 
arbitrariness.    It  has  a  distinct  place  within  the  process  of  generating  legitimate 
cooperative principles.  It shares with effort the fact that plans of life, by themselves, 
cannot justify differential shares within a cooperative system; I cannot simply cite the 
inherently superior nature of my way of life in arguing for a higher share of distributive 
goods.  The original position therefore excludes knowledge of plans of life to ensure 
impartiality in the selection of principles.  Such plans are not arbitrary, but they cannot be 
legitimately  appealed  to  in  the  construction  of  legitimate  principles  we  can  expect 
contracting parties to endorse.  A plan of life, however, is distinct from effort. Plans of 
life, from within the methodology espoused by Rawls, must be respected to the extent 
that they can be made compatible with other plans of life, as part of the broader process 
of respecting individuals.  Given that the cooperation we seek is to occur within the 44
context of a broad diversity of plans of life and views about the good, we must respect 
these plans of life if we are to determine principles all participants have reason to accept.
We  may  thus  examine  plans  of  life  with  reference  to  the  idea  of  political 
coercion.  We seek to justify such coercion to free and equal persons.  We cannot insist 
that a single way of life is inherently superior to another.  Nor can we make our own way 
of life an illegitimate burden upon others, by refusing to cooperate in productive activities 
underlying social cooperation. The veil of ignorance, understood in this light, does not 
model conclusions about moral arbitrariness, but a political conception of what burdens 
we can legitimately place upon others.  Plans of life are excluded in the original position 
not because they are morally arbitrary, but because of the unique place of such plans in 
the justification of political coercion.  Rawlsian liberal egalitarians have, therefore, no 
need to abandon the use of the veil of ignorance in their theoretical explorations.
5.3 What, then, of effort?  While effort is similarly excluded from what is known in the 
original position, the reason for its exclusion is distinct.  Both effort and plans of life, we 
may acknowledge, are morally mixed.  They are both the result of a combination of free 
choice and unchosen circumstance.  From the standpoint of a theory concerned to justify 
political coercion to free and equal persons, the question arises: can such an aspect of 
persons legitimately ground an inequality in distributive shares?  The answer to such a 
question  may  be  controversial, but  to  answer no seems at least a plausible response.  
Principles allowing even partly caused aspects of persons to influence distributive shares 
directly in this way might be legitimately resisted by reasonable persons.  45
It is worth noticing that the question asked by Roemer depends upon an ability to 
discount circumstance from choice that seems utterly unavailable to limited creatures 
such as ourselves.  The only question we may ask is whether effort, taken as a whole, 
may legitimately influence distributive shares; focusing upon that proportion of effort due 
to choice assumes knowledge we do not, and could not, have.  This is why Rawls terms 
reward for  effort  impractible,  rather than illegitimate.   Were  we  able  to  perform the 
hypothetical calculation imagined here, we would perhaps have reason to do so.  Given 
the  very  human  nature  of  our  knowledge,  however,  we  cannot;  and  given  this  fact, 
distributive  principles  rejecting  rewards  for effort  are  in  line  with  notions  of 
responsibility that can be used in indirect models. It is also worth noticing, finally, that 
the question of effort is perhaps less important than is generally assumed.  The only form 
of effort for which we  receive no credit is effort  within a given profession  or social 
position.  Cooperative systems such as Rawls’s, however, allow differential rewards to 
flow  to  different  positions;  and  they  allow  talents  and  ambitions  to  determine  the 
allocation of persons to positions.
38  The talent set of any given individual, however, is 
far from static.  An individual’s effort in the development of new talents, the refinement 
of existing talents, and the acquisition of new skills enables her to attain new positions.  
All this, of course, is perfectly in harmony with Rawls’s system, which does not 
seek to equalize individual talents but marshal those talents for the benefit of all.  What 
this means, however, is that individual choice to expend effort will often be rewarded 
with additional distributive shares.  Individuals expend differential amounts of efforts 
                                                
38 Rawls’s system may also allow differentials within positions, when those differentials 
result from choices for leisure time versus other goods.  A dentist who chooses to treat 
more patients may legitimately gain more income than one who chooses to treat fewer.  
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.46
within  a  given  social  position,  and  they  expend  differential  amounts  of  efforts  in 
professional and social advancement.  The former sort of differential gives individuals no 
claim upon others for additional goods; the latter, however, may legitimate differential 
rewards, as individuals develop differential sets of talents and skills.  Rawls is frequently 
accused of insufficient  sensitivity to  effort by those who assume talents  to  be static. 
When  this  view  is  replaced  with  a  more  dynamic  conception  of  talent,  we  find  that 
individual effort may be relevant to distributive shares in a real, albeit indirect, manner.
In a nutshell, then, Roemer, like Arneson, does not have a case against Rawls, and 
the reason for this is that he, again like Arneson, endorses a direct model of distributive 
equality, rather than an indirect one. 
6. Conclusions
Nothing  we  have  said  here mandates  the  choice  of  an  indirect  model  of  distributive 
equality. We hope only to have demonstrated that the distinction between indirect and 
direct models of distributive equality is a valid, and important, distinction.  We hope, 
further, to have demonstrated that the conceptions of responsibility accompanying these 
models are similarly distinct.  Those theorists who would seek to critique the validity of 
an indirect theory of distributive equality, therefore, have more work to do than simply to 
demonstrate the ways in which such theories are incompatible with a direct notion of 
responsibility.  The indirect model is immune from such criticisms, inasmuch as it relies 
upon a distinct notion of responsibility involved in the justification of political coercion, 
rather that the perhaps more immediate moral notion of moral responsibility.  The critics 
of indirect theorists such as Rawls may, in the end, be correct; but such critique cannot 47
proceed  in  the  manner  in  which  it  has  generally  been  undertaken.    A  fresh  start  is 
required; and, until this task is undertaken, indirect theorists such as Rawls may take their 
theories to have survived the challenge posed by responsibility-catering egalitarians.
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